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EMPLOYMENT ACT (ADEA) - The United States Supreme Court held
that despite the unmistakably clear intent of Congress to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from private lawsuits,
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's purported abrogation
is invalid as it is not an appropriate exercise of the Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power of Congress.
Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
Petitioners, in three separate federal actions, sued their state
employers alleging, inter alia, that their employers discriminated
against them based upon age in violation of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act ("ADEA" or "Act"). 1 In 1994, Roderick
MacPherson and Marvin Narz sued their employer, the University
of Montevallo, alleging that the university retaliated against them
for having filed an earlier discrimination charge, and that the
university's evaluation system favored younger faculty.2 In the
second case, in 1995, J. Daniel Kimel, Jr. and other current and
former employees of the Florida State University sued the Florida
Board of Regents alleging that the university's allocation of funds
adversely affected the pay of more senior employees, most of
whom were older.3 The third action arose in May 1996, with
1. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S.Ct. 631, 636 (2000). The ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§
621-634 (1994), makes it unlawful for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
2. Kimel, 120 . Ct. at 638. The University of Montevallo is a state university in
Alabama. Brief for Petitioners at 7, Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000)
(Nos. 98-791, 98-796). MacPherson and Narz were the oldest faculty members of the
university's College of Business. Id. Neither side disputed that the university is an
instrumentality of the state. MacPherson v. Univ. of Montevallo, 938 F.Supp 785, 787 (N.D.
Ala. 1996).
3. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 638.
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Wellington Dickson suing his employer, the Florida Department of
Corrections, alleging that his employer denied his promotion
4
because of his age.
In all three cases, the state defendants moved to dismiss the
complaints based upon their Eleventh Amendment immunity.5 In
MacPherson v. University of Montevallo,6 the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama granted the motion, while the District
Court for the Northern District of Florida denied the motions in
both Florida cases. 7 The plaintiffs in MacPherson and the Florida
state defendants appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
and the appeals were consolidated.8 The United States intervened9
to defend the ADEA's abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment
immunity of the States.10
The court of appeals, in a divided panel opinion, held that the
ADEA does not abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment
immunity; therefore, the Act's private right of action against the
states is invalid.1 Judge Edmondson stated that Congress was
unsuccessful in abrogating the State's immunity because the ADEA
lacked unmistakably clear language of congressional intent to do
so. 2 Judge Cox concurred in the result that the States are immune
4. Id. Dickson alleged that the discriminatory conduct occurred over a five-year
period, while he was in his late 50's and early 60's. Brief for Petitioners at 7, Kimel (Nos.
98-791, 98-796).
5. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 637. The Eleventh Amendment of the United States
Constitution states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
CONST. amend. XI.
6. 938 ESupp. 785 (N.D. Ala. 1996).
7. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 638-39.
8. Id. at 639. The orders in the two Florida state cases, although interlocutory, were
appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 E3d
1426, 1429 (11th Cir. 1998). This doctrine allows [the] appeal of an interlocutory order that
conclusively determines an issue collateral to the merits of the underlying action, but which
is effectively unreviewable from a final judgment. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 262 (6th ed. 1990).
A district court's denial of a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity conclusively determines
that a state is not immune from suit. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1993). This order must be immediately reviewable;
otherwise, the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity right would be effectively lost. Id.
9. Intervention allows a party, not originally named in the lawsuit, to enter the action
because she has a personal stake in the outcome. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 820 (6th ed. 1990).
The United States can intervene in any proceeding in a United States court wherein the
constitutionality of an act of Congress is at issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1994).
10. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 639.
11. Kimel, 139 F3d at 1433.
12. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 639. "In order to determine whether Congress has abrogated
the States' sovereign immunity, we must ask two questions: first, whether Congress has
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from ADEA suits, but on different grounds.13 He did not resolve the
"thorny issue of Congress's intent," 4 but instead found that
Congress exceeded its constitutional authority granted by the
enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 5 Judge Cox
held that the ADEA bestows rights far beyond those embodied in
the Fourteenth Amendment and that the Act's remedies are not
proportional to any infringement of older persons' constitutional
rights.16 Chief Judge Hatchett disagreed with his colleagues.' He
concluded that Congress's intent in the ADEA is unmistakably
clear, and the statute is a proper exercise of its Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement powers.'8
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
split among the federal courts of appeals on whether the ADEA
properly abrogates the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the
20
states.' 9 In resolving this issue, the Court addressed two questions.
Did Congress unequivocally express its intent to abrogate that
immunity, and, if so, did it act under proper constitutional
21
authority?
Writing for the majority, 22 Justice O'Connor began by reiterating
the Court's "simple but stringent test" that the language of the
statute must convey Congress's unmistakable intent to abrogate the
states' immunity from suit in federal court23 In 1974, Congress
unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the immunity; and second, whether Congress
has acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power." Seminole Tribe V. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55
(1996) (citation omitted).
13. Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 639
14. Kimel, 139 E3d at 1445 (Cox, J., concurring).
15. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 639. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The amendment further provides: "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
16. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 639.
17. Kimet, 139 F3d at 1434 (Hatchett, C.J., dissenting in part).
18. Id.
19. Kimel, 120 S.Ct. 639. Certiorari is a discretionary writ issued by an appellate court
directing a lower court to deliver the case record for review. BLACK'S LAw DIcnoNAY 228 (6th
ed. 1990).
20. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 640.
21. Id.
22. The four-part decision commanded a 5-4 majority in Parts I, U, and IV, and a 7-2
majority in Part [I. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 636.
23. Id. at 640 (citing DeUmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989), which held that the
Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994), does not abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity). The "simple but stringent test" is the Atascadero clear
statement rule formulated in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
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amended the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)2 4 to allow an
employee to maintain an action "against any employer (including a
public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction. " 25 The ADEA incorporates this enforcement provision
by reference in § 626(b). 26 The Kimel Court found that the ADEA/s
incorporation of the FLSA's enforcement provision clearly
demonstrates Congress's intent to permit private employees to sue
27
state employers in federal court.

The respondents, however, argued that Congress failed to make
its intent to abrogate state immunity unmistakably clear in §
626(b). 28 They claimed that the ADEA contains its own, separate
enforcement provision in § 626(c)(1) to the derogation of the
incorporation reference in § 626(b).29 In rejecting this point, the
Court noted that it has previously explained that the ADEA's
separate enforcement options in § 626(c)(1) are coterminous with
the incorporated provisions of the FLSA.30 The Court also rejected
the respondent's contention that the phrase "court of competent
31
jurisdiction" in the FLSA's § 216(b) obscured congressional intent.
The Court further noted that § 216(b) contains no ambiguity as
judged by the language of the section itself, which authorizes
employee suits against States "in any Federal or State court of
competent jurisdiction."32
The majority disagreed with Justice Thomas's dissent that argued
that Congress failed to recognize that its 1974 amendment of the
24. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
25. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 641-42. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-259, § 6(d)(1), 88 Stat. 55 (1974). In the same statute, Congress also amended § 630(b)
of the ADEA to apply to "a state or political subdivision of a state and any agency or
instrumentality of a state." § 28(a)(1).
26. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 640. The ADEA states: "The provisions of this chapter'shall be
enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections
211(b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and 217 of this title, and subsection (c) of
this section." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
27. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 640.
28. Id.
29. Id. The ADEA states: "Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of
competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of
this chapter . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1994).
30. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 641.
31. Id. Respondents had cited Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commissioner, 327
U.S. 573 (1946). The issue in that case was whether Utah had waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity in enacting a state statute that permitted certain taxpayers to sue in
any "court of competent jurisdiction." Kennecott, 327 U.S. at 578. The Kennecott Court held
that this language failed to show unequivocal consent to suit in federal courts. Id. at 579-80.
32. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 641.
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FLSA would create an additional abrogation provision within the
ADEA23 For the majority, it was clear that Congress deliberated on
the full consequences of abrogation because it amended both the
FLSA and the ADEA in the very same statute. 34 Furthermore, the
Court implied that the dissenters' version of the clear statement
inquiry led to an unwarranted inference of ambiguity.35 For the
seven-member majority, the "clear textual statement" of the statute
36
was sufficient evidence of Congress's intent to abrogate.
Once the Court concluded that Congress unequivocally intended
to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, it next
considered whether Congress acted under an effective grant of
constitutional authority. 37 Justice O'Connor first noted that the
Court had already considered the amended ADEA and its relation
to state governments. 38 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 39 the Court held that
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC")
enforcement of the ADEA is consonant with the Article I
commerce power4 ° of Congress. 41 In ruling that the EEOC could
enforce the Act in federal court, the Court had found it
unnecessary to address whether the ADEA was valid under Section
33. Id. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented from only Part II of the
opinion. Id. at 654 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The two justices concurred with Parts I, II, and
IV in holding that Congress exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. Id. at
654 n.1.
34. Id. at 642. See § 28(a)(1) of Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L No.
93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (1974).
35. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 642. The majority stated:
In any event, we have never held that Congress must speak with different gradations
of clarity depending on specific circumstances of the relevant legislation (e.g.,
amending incorporated provisions as opposed to enacting a statute for the first time).
The clear statement inquiry focuses on what Congress did, not when it did so. We will
not infer ambiguity from the sequence in which a clear textual statement is added to
the statute.
Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
40. The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides: "Congress shall
have Power... to regulate Commerce ... among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3.
41. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 642. In EEOC v. Wyoming, the ADEA was found not to be a
violation of the principles of state sovereignty embodied in the Tenth Amendment, as
construed in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985). EEOC, 460 U.S. at 236. The
EEOC Court concluded that even if the ADEA affected an attribute of state sovereignty, the
Act does not "directly impair... traditional areas of governmental function." EEOC, 460 U.S.
at 239 (quoting Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851).
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5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 In the present case, however, the
petitioners, as private party plaintiffs, placed the issue directly
before the Court.4
Recalling its decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida," the Court
reaffirmed that Congress may not abrogate the states' immunity
under the Article I Commerce Clause.45 The majority rejected
Justice Stevens's later dissenting view that Seminole Tribe was a
departure from the Court's constitutional jurisprudence. 46 The
majority considered Seminole Tribe to be a "valid and natural"
result of Hans v. Louisiana,47 which was "rendered over a full
century ago." 4" The Court declared its adherence to the Seminole
Tribe holding that Congress does not have the power under Article
I to subject the states to private suits. 49 Since the ADEA could not
abrogate state immunity under Article I, the Court stated that the
petitioners might maintain their suits only if the ADEA is
appropriate legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 50
To the majority, the dispositive issue was whether the ADEA was
appropriate legislation under the enforcement provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 51 Justice O'Connor began this analysis by
noting that the Court, in City of Boerne v. IMores,52 had recently
reaffirmed that Section 5 is an affirmative grant of power to
42. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 642.
43. Id. at 643.
44. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)).
45. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 642. Seminole Tribe marked a reversal of a brief excursion in
Union Gas from the century-old doctrine set forth in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890),
that principles of state sovereignty precluded private suits against the state. Hans, 134 U.S.
at 13. See generally Philip W. Berezniak, Recent Case, 35 DUQ. L.REV. 741, 744 n.27 (1997).
46. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 643.
47. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
48. Id. The majority firmly noted: "[Tihe present dissenters' refusal to accept the
validity and natural import of decisions like Hans . . . makes it difficult to engage in
additional meaningful debate on the place of state sovereign immunity in the Constitution."
Id.
49. Id. at 64445.
50. Id. at 644. "This Court has found authority to abrogate under only two
constitutional provisions: the Fourteenth Amendment . . . and, in a plurality opinion, the
Interstate Commerce Clause, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas [overruled]." Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 44-45.
51. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 644. The Court quoted Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976), which stated that "the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty
which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
52. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.' City of Boerne
stated that, although enforcement consists of both remedying and
deterring violations of rights protected by the amendment,
Congress may not alter the "substantive meaning" of the Fourteenth
Amendment.M As the Kimel Court noted, appropriate legislation
enforces a right, but does not define a right.5 To decide whether
the ADEA was appropriate legislation, Justice O'Connor applied the6
"congruence and proportionality" test set forth in City of Boerne1
In doing so, the majority concluded that the ADEA exceeded
57
Congress's Section 5 enforcement powers.
The Court concluded that the ADEA was disproportionate to any
Unlike
racial
discriminatory
state conduct.5
conceivable
classifications, which are immediately suspect, the Court reiterated
that states may discriminate with respect to age, provided the
classification rationally relates to a legitimate state interest.59 In
reviewing rational basis scrutiny as applied to discrimination, the
majority noted that a state is allowed to use age as a proxy for a
person's other attributes as long as the age classification is
reasonable. 60 The Court further noted the wide latitude its
age-related equal protection jurisprudence affords the states under
the rational basis standard. 61 In contrast, the ADEA, the majority
concluded, places substantially more restrictions on state
53. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 644.
54. Id. "
55. Id. (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519).
56. Id. The Court explained as follows:
While the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and
measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern,
and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction
exists and it must be observed. There must be a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20.
57. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 645.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 646.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 64547. For example, in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam), the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a
Massachusetts statute requiring state police officers to retire at 50. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 317.
The Court recognized that the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring that its police
officers are physically capable of protecting the public. Id. at 314. Since physical
performance declines with age, the state could rationally conclude that a mandatory
retirement age of 50 would further this interest. Id. at 315. The fact that individualized
fitness testing would further this interest more effectively, or that age as a proxy for fitness
is inaccurate in certain individual cases, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at
314-15.
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62
employers than required by the Equal Protection Clause.
The petitioners, attempting to show otherwise, argued that the
ADEis bona fide occupational exception prevented the Act from
expanding the substantive contours of the Fourteenth
Amendment.6 The Court rejected this contention, and stated that
the bona fide occupational qualification is more restrictive than the
1
rational basis standard as applied to the Equal Protection Clause.6
In fact, the Court noted that even with the ADEA's exception
provision, the standard of review required by the Act bordered on
65
heightened scrutiny.
The Court held that while the ADEA bestows rights beyond those
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment, this does not necessarily
make the Act inappropriate. 66 Reaffirming its view in City of
Boerne, the Court wrote that strong remedial measures are
appropriate when the constitutional infraction requires strong
action by Congress.67 Therefore, the Court next examined the
ADEA:s legislative record for evidence that would support such
expansive legislation.6s
Justice O'Connor pointedly stated that Congress's findings failed
to reveal any pattern of age discrimination. 69 The Court dismissed
the petitioner's evidence purporting to show discrimination against
state employees as consisting "almost entirely of isolated sentences

62. Id. The Court stated that § 623(a)(1) of the ADEA made all age discrimination
unlawful. Id.
63. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 647. "It shall not be unlawful for an employer... to take any
action otherwise prohibited . . . where age is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business." 29 U.S.C. §
623(f)(1) (1994).
64. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 647. The Court recalled its decision in Western Air Lines, Inc.
v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985). In this case, employees sued Western Air Lines for violating
the ADEA by requiring flight engineers to retire at age 60. Criswell, 472 U.S. at 405. The
employer asserted that age is a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ"), reasonably
necessary for safe operation. Id. at 406. The Court concluded that the "reasonable necessity"
for allowing the BFOQ defense is significantly different from the "reasonableness" of rational
basis scrutiny. Id. at 419-21. The ADEA presumes that age discrimination is unlawful, and the
BFOQ defense is meant to be a rare exception to a general rule. Id. at 421.
65. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 648. "The exception simply makes clear that the employer
cannot rely on age as a proxy for an employee's remaining characteristics, such as
productivity, but must instead focus on those factors directly." Id. (citation omitted).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. "Our examination of the ADEA's legislative record confirms that Congress's 1974
extensions of the Act to the States was an unwarranted response to a perhaps
inconsequential problem." Id. at 648-49.
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clipped from floor debates and legislative reports."70 Congress's
finding of substantial age discrimination in the private sector was
insufficient to permit the Court to infer a similar pattern of bias by
the states. 71 Reviewing the ADE's legislative record as a whole, the
Court found no reason to believe that there was a widespread
problem of age discrimination among state employees.72
Based on the broad reach of the ADEA's substantive provisions,
and the lack of evidence of unconstitutional age discrimination by
the states, the Court held that the ADEA exceeds Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers and that the Act's
abrogation of state immunity is invalid. 73 Although the Court
foreclosed a federal avenue of relief for state employees, it noted
that ample protections still exist at the state level. 74 According to
the Court, state age discrimination statues permit state employees
75
to recover money damages in all but two states.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stridently rejected the
majority's view of the Eleventh Amendment's limitation on the
Article I powers of Congress. 76 Justice Stevens called the reasoning
of Seminole Tribe "so profoundly mistaken and so fundamentally
inconsistent with the Framer's conception of the constitutional
order" that it should not be given the "deference or respect"
normally afforded by stare decisis.77 According to Justice Stevens,
the proper guardian of state sovereignty is not the judiciary, but
Congress. 78 To him, the five-member majority of Seminole Tribe
misapplied the "ancient judge-made doctrine of sovereign
immunity" to "aggrandize" the judicial branch.7 9 For Justice Stevens,
the ADE's abrogation of state immunity is within the Article I
commerce power of Congress as is the Act's authorization of
70. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 649. "Like the assorted sentences petitioners cobble together
from a decade's worth of congressional reports and floor debates, the California study does
not indicate that the state had engaged in any unconstitutional age discrimination." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 650.
74. Id.
75. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 650 n.1. The Court cited statutes in all states except Alabama
and South Dakota.

76. Id. at 650 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice
Breyer joined Justice Stevens, dissenting in part and concurring in part. Id. The same four
justices also dissented in Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76. Id.
77. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 653.
78. Id. at 651.
79. Id. at 651-52 & n.3.
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private remedies against unconsenting states.8 0

Justice Thomas dissented from the majority opinion on the
narrow issue of whether Congress made its intent to abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity unmistakably clear.8' Justice
Thomas's fundamental objection derived from Congress's failure to
express its intention to abrogate within the text of the ADEA
itself.82 He did not reject the notion that Congress could abrogate
through an incorporating reference, nor did he even dispute that
the ADEA, in fact, incorporates some of the enforcement provisions
of the FLSA.83 However, for him it was "open to debate whether"
Congress intended the FLSA:s private right of action to apply to the
ADEA as well. 4 While Justice Thomas accepted some of the
majority's reasoning as plausible, he concluded that the language of
the statute, nevertheless, fell short of the unmistakably clear
standards 5 For Justice Thomas, a "permissible inference" is no
substitute for the "unequivocal declaration" required by the
88

unmistakably clear inquiry.
The majority, on the other hand, viewed its rationale as grounded
in well-established precedent, naturally derived from over a
century's jurisprudence surrounding the Eleventh Amendment.8 7
While the Kimel Court dated its analysis of the Eleventh
Amendment as extending over just one century, the full extent of
its jurisprudence actually encompasses more than two.
The Eleventh Amendment was adopted specifically to overrule
80. Id. at 651-52.
81. Id. at 654 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas quoted the so-called "clear
statement" rule of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). "Congress may
abrogate.., only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."
Kimet, 120 S. Ct. at 654 (quoting Atascadero State Hospital, 473 U.S. at 242). "This rule
Iassures that the legislature has in fact faced and intended to bring into issue, the critical
matters involved in the judicial decision.' " Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 654 (quoting Will v. Michigan
Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)).
82. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 654.
83. Id. at 657.
84. Id.
Where Congress amends an Act whose provisions are incorporated by other Acts, the
bill under consideration does not necessarily mention the incorporating references in
those other Acts, and so fails to inspire confidence that Congress deliberated on the
consequences of the amendment for the other Acts. That is the case here .... And,
given the purposes of the clear statement rule... I am unwilling to indulge the fiction
that Congress, when it amended § 216(b), recognized the consequences for a separate
Act (the ADEA) that incorporates the amended provision.
Id. at 655-56.
85. Id. at 658.
86. Id. at 658.
87. Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 643.
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the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,88 which held
that Article III of the Constitution authorizes a private citizen of
one state to sue another state in federal court.8 9 The outrage
Chisholm engendered among the states led the House of
Representatives to propose this amendment just one day after the
Court announced its decisionf 0 While the amendment literally
appears to bar only federal diversity suits, Hans v. Louisiana
established the doctrine that the Eleventh Amendment's grant of
state immunity prohibits suits by a state's own citizens as well.91
In Hans, a citizen of Louisiana brought an action in federal court
to recover the accrued interest on certain state bonds that the state
refused to honor.92 The plaintiff asserted that the court had federal
question jurisdiction because the state's repudiation of the bonds
violated the Contracts Clause of the Constitution.93 In affirming the
lower court's dismissal of the case, the United States Supreme
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment not only bars diversity
suits, but also federal question suits by a state's own citizens. 94 In
reaching this result, the Court interpreted the Eleventh Amendment
as a constitutional recognition that the federal union is comprised
of sovereign states.9 5 The Hans Court called it "almost an absurdity
on its face" to presume that the states would have adopted the
Eleventh Amendment had it contained a provision allowing the
96
states to be hauled into federal court by their own citizens.
88. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Chisholm had sued Georgia before the Supreme Court in
an action of assumpsit on behalf of his testator, a citizen of South Carolina. Id. at 420.
89. See generally Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2249-50 (1999) (discussing the
outrage" at the Chisholm decision and the subsequent events that culminated in the
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment).
90. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2250.
91. Hans, 134 U.S. at 21.
92. Id. at 1-3. The plaintiff, Hans, alleged that Louisiana had collected taxes for
payment of certain bonds, but that it unlawfully diverted the funds to pay the general
expenses of the state. Id. at 3.
93. Id. at 3. "No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
94. Hans, 134 U.S. at 14-15.
95. Id. at 13.
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its conseht. This is the general sense and the general practice of
mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed
by the government of every state in the Union .... The contracts between a nation
and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no
pretension to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action independent of the
sovereign will.
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
96. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
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The Hans Court's recognition that the Eleventh Amendment
embodies the principle of state sovereignty has remained the
foundation of the Court's jurisprudence in this area for over a
century.9 7 In the years since Hans, Congress has very rarely
abrogated the states' immunity from suit in federal court. In fact,
the Supreme Court has upheld abrogation by Congress in only two
circumstances. 98 In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Court held that the
enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment can preempt
the state sovereignty embodied in the Eleventh Amendment. 9 In
only one other case, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 100 has the
Court upheld congressional abrogation of the states' immunity.10 '
In Union Gas, the Court held that the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980,l02 as amended, effectively abrogated the states' immunity from
private suits in federal court. 0 3 In reaching this result, a plurality of

four held that the plenary power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce would be incomplete without authority to authorize suits
holding states liable for damages. °4 Justice White provided the fifth
vote for the result, although he wrote separately to stress that he
disagreed with much of the plurality's reasoning. 0 5 The fragmented
holding of Union Gas proved to be short-lived as it was overruled
just five years later in Seminole Tribe 0 6
In Seminole Tribe, the Court was confronted with Congress's
purported abrogation of state inrnunity in the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act ("IGRA"),10 7 which Congress enacted pursuant to its
97. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 67.
98. Id. at 59.
99. 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
100. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.
101. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994). The statute, as amended, authorized private suits in
federal courts for money damages against states as owners or operators of hazardous waste
sites. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5-6.
103. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 13.
104. Id. at 19-20. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion with respect to this part of the
decision. Id. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Id. The Constitution's
Commerce Clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl.3.
105. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 57 (White, J., concurring). Four justices joined in dissent,
expressly rejecting the plurality's reasoning. Id. at 57. See also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 63
(summarizing the splintered reasoning in Union Gas).
106. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.
107. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994). The provision of the statute at issue here concerned
the congressional authorization of such gaming activities as "slot machines, casino games,
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authority under the Indian Commerce Clause."~ The IGRA required
a state to negotiate in good faith with its Indian tribes regarding
gaming activities and permitted a tribe to enforce this provision in
federal court. 1°9 The five-member majority of Seminole Tribe
considered the "deeply fractured decision" of Union Gas to be a
"solitary departure from established law" that had been reaffirmed
repeatedly since Hans v. Louisiana.10 The Seminole Tribe Court
also questioned the precedential value of Union Gas, since a
majority of the Court expressly rejected the reasoning of the
four-member plurality."' Given the fractured reasoning behind
Union Gas and the hundred-plus years of constitutional
jurisprudence adhering to Hans, the Seminole Tribe Court
concluded that Union Gas was incorrectly decided and overruled

it.11 2 Following the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe, Fitzpatrick

v. Bitzer remained the lone sentinel in holding that Congress may
113
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
In Fitzpatrick, male employees sued their employer, the State of
Connecticut, alleging that its retirement plan discriminated against
them based upon their sex, in violation of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.114 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, which held that the Civil Rights Act's private
enforcement provision violated the Eleventh Amendment because it
banking card games, dog racing, and lotteries within tribal territory." Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 48. Among the requirements for the gaming to be lawful was the existence of
tribal-state agreement regulating the conduct of the gaming activities. Id. at 50.
108. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47. "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate
Commerce... with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
109. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
110. Id. at 64-66.
111. Id. at 66. "[Tlhe degree of confusion following a splintered... decision is itself a
reason for reexamining that decision." Id. (quoting Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746
(1994)).
112. Id.
113. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 445.
114. Id. The Civil Rights Act authorized federal suits against a state employer if it
discriminated because of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42. U.S.C.' §
2000e-2(a) (1994). Fitzpatrick and other current and retired male employees sued their
employer, the State of Connecticut, alleging that the state's retirement plan discriminated
against them based on their sex. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448. The state's plan, in fact,
discriminated based on sex by allowing women to retire five years earlier than men with
identical service. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 390 F.Supp 278, 279-80 (D. Conn. 1974). The plan also
treated women preferentially in the rate of accrual of retirement benefits. Id. at 280. The
district court, perhaps facetiously, noted the paternalistic attitude that led many states to
adopt similar statutes: "The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother." Fitzpatrick, 390 F.Supp. at 282 (quoting Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872)).
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required payment of money damages from the state treasury. 15 In
reaching its decision, the Supreme Court considered whether
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment'16 authorized Congress to
17
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The Fitzpatrick Court answered this question by examining the
nature of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive prohibitions."l 8
The Court noted that Section 1 of the Amendment directly restrains
state conduct. 19 The Court then reasoned that legislation
appropriate for enforcing the Amendment is an expressly
sanctioned intrusion into state sovereignty. 120 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity can be
abrogated when Congress determines that such a remedy is
21
appropriate for enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The Fitzpatrick Court pointed out that the issue of whether the
Civil Rights Act was, in fact, appropriate legislation was not
raised. 122 The issue of whether an act of Congress is appropriate
legislation arouse nearly two decades later in City of Boerne v.
23
M~ores.1
In City of Boerne, the City of Boerne, Texas, denied a building
permit to enlarge a Catholic church because it considered the
expansion inconsistent with the area's historic character.' 24 The
Archbishop of San Antonio sued in federal district court
challenging the denial under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA). 125 The Archbishop alleged that the city infringed upon the
parishioner's free exercise rights as protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 26 The district court held that
115. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 450.
116. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
117. Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 451.
118. Id. at 453-56.
119. Id. at 453. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
w'ithin its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
120. Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 456.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 456 n.ll.
123. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
124. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512.
125. Id. One of the RFtA's stated purposes is to "provide a clain or defense to persons
whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by the government." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)
(1994).
126. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. See generally Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303 (1940) (holding that the "fundamental concept of liberty embodied" in the Due
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the RFRA was unconstitutional because it exceeded the Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power of Congress. 127 The court of
appeals subsequently found the legislation to be appropriate and
reversed.' 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether Congress exceeded its enforcement power under the
1 29
Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress enacted the RFRA in response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Department of Human Resources v. Smith.' 3° The
Smith Court upheld the denial of unemployment compensation
benefits to members of the Native American Church whose
sacramental peyote use had caused them to lose their jobs. 131 In
Smith, the Court refused to balance the rights of the church
members with the state's compelling interest in enforcing criminal
laws. 132 The Court held that generally applicable laws are equally
enforceable against religious practices, and, consequently, the
Native American Church members' use of peyote could lawfully be
proscribed. '-3 In an attempt to ameliorate the consequences of
Smith, Congress enacted the RFRA purportedly under its
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power "to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner."'34
In City of Boerne, the Court rejected Congress's attempt to
impose a standard of review on the judiciary as fundamentally at
odds with the separation of powers doctrine.1 35 The Court flatly
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights secured by the First
Amendment).
127. Id. at 512.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
131. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 513 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 885).
132. Id. The Supreme Court set forth this balancing test in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963). City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 513. The Sherbert Court reversed the denial of
unemployment compensation benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist for refusing to work on
the Sabbath day. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402. The Sherbert Court applied a balancing test that
asked, "whether some compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the
South Carolina statute justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment
right." Id. at 406.
133. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514. The Court noted that the only time it invalidates a
generally applicable law on free exercise grounds is when the law restrains another
constitutionally protected right. Id. As an example, the Court noted Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972), where Amish parents challenged a mandatory school attendance law on free
exercise grounds. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514. In invalidating the law, the Yoder Court
recognized that the law restrained the protected right of the Amish parents to control their
children's education in addition to their free exercise of religion. Id.
134. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515-16 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1994)).
135. Id. at 536.
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announced, "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by
changing what the right is. It has been given the power 'to enforce,'
not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional
violation." 36 Congress properly enforces a right when there is "a
congruence and a proportionality between the injury to be
137
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."
Absent such congruence and proportionality, the Court ruled that a
law is not enforcing a right, but impermissibly effecting a
substantive change in the right.138
The City of Boerne Court found that the RFRA failed the
congruence and proportionality test. 39 The Court found congruence
lacking because the RFRA's legislative record failed to demonstrate
modem examples of state-sponsored religious bigotry.140 While it
appeared to the Court that the RFRA was unneeded legislation, it
4
declared that this was not the RFRA's most serious shortcoming.' '
The Court implied that failure to meet the congruence portion of
the test is not always fatal, since judicial deference allows
Congress its own reasons for its actions. 42 Rather, the Court found
the lack of proportionality between the purported injury and the
remedy to be the Act's most serious shortcoming. 43
The Court found that by requiring a state to satisfy compelling
interest scrutiny, the RFRA burdened the state by forcing it to
defend its general regulatory laws against the highest standard of
constitutional review. 44 Were such a burden of scrutiny forced on
the states, the Court suggested that many constitutionally
136. Id. at 519.
137. Id. Congruence requires that Congress identify a pattern of state conduct violating
the Fourteenth Amendment. Kimet, 120 S. Ct. at 645. Proportionality requires that the law
proscribe conduct that at least has a likelihood of being unconstitutional, while not
burdening conduct that passes constitutional muster. Id.
138. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
139. Id. at 533.
140. Id. at 530.
In contrast to the record which confronted Congress and the judiciary in the voting
rights cases, the RFRAs legislative record lacks examples of modern instances of
generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry. The history of
persecution in this country detailed in the hearings mentions no episodes occurring in
the past 40 years.
Id.
141. Id. at 530-31.
142. Id. at 531-32.
143. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534.
144. Id. The Court interpreted the RFRA as requiring that the "[sitate must
demonstrate a compelling governmental interest and show that the law is the least restrictive
means of furthering its interest." Id.
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permissible laws would fail this heightened level of scrutiny. 4 5 For
these reasons, the City of Boerne Court held that the RFRA was
not appropriate legislation for enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment. 146 Consequently, its purported abrogation of state
47
Eleventh Amendment immunity was invalid
Two years after City of Boerne, the Supreme Court again applied
the congruence and proportionality test to another statute
48
purporting to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
In 1990, Congress enacted the Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act 49 (the "Patent Remedy Act") to clarify
that states may be sued in federal court for patent infringements. 50
Shortly thereafter, College Savings Bank, a New Jersey chartered
bank, sued the Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board, a state entity, for infringing on its patented college savings
plan. 5' In responding to Florida Prepaid's motion to dismiss on the
grounds of sovereign immunity, College Savings asserted that the
Patent Remedy Act is appropriate legislation for enforcing the Due
15 2
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Florida Prepaid Court reaffirmed the congruence and
proportionality test set forth in City of Boerne.lw After restating the
test, the Court concluded: "We thus held that for Congress to
invoke § 5, it must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth
145. Id.
146. Id. at 532-36.
147. Id.
148. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 119 S.
Ct. 2199 (1999).
149. 35 U.S.C §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1994). Congress enacted this statute in response to
several court decisions holding that existing patent laws did not clearly show that Congress
intended to abrogate state immunity from suit. Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2203.
150. Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2203. "In response to Chew [v. California, 893 F.2d
331 (E.D. Cal. 1990)] and similar decisions, Congress enacted the Patent Remedy Act to
'clarify that States, instrumentalities of States, and officers and employees of States acting in
their official capacity, are subject to suit in Federal court by any person for infringement of
patents and plant variety protections.' " FloridaPrepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2203 (quoting Pub. L.
No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1990)).
151. Florida Prepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2202-03.
152. Id. at 2204. Florida Prepaid moved to dismiss because of its Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit. Id. at 2203-04.
153. Id. at 2206-07. The Court also reaffirmed its ruling in City of Boerne regarding the
scope of the enforcement power of Congress:
We recognized that "legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can
fall within the sweep of Congress's enforcement power even if in the process it
prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into legislative
spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States."
Id. at 2206 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518).
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Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative
scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct."' 1 In applying
the test to the Patent Remedy Act, the Court ruled that it was not
155
appropriate Section 5 legislation.
As in City of Boerne, the Florida Prepaid Court noted that
Congress failed to identify a "pattern of patent infringement by the
States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations." 56 While the
Court stated that a lack of supportive evidence is not fatal, it is still
"critical" that Congress identify "the targeted constitutional wrong
or evil" to be remedied. 157 The Court remarked that the Patent
Remedy Act might have been properly targeted had Congress
identified a pattern of state patent infringement coupled with due
process violations caused from states pleading Eleventh
Amendment immunity.158 Lacking this, the Court concluded that the
act is not proportionate to any legitimate "prophylactic" or remedial
objective. 59 By lacking proportionality, the Patent Remedy Act
would potentially leave a state open to an unlimited array of
infringement claims any time it used a patented product or
process. 60 Given the scant legislative history and the broad scope
of the Act's reach, the Court concluded that the Patent Remedy Act
was not appropriate legislation for enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment. 61
The reasoning of the decision in Kimel closely paralleled the
reasoning of City of Boerne and Florida Prepaid.16 2 The distinction
in Kimel is that the Court had to determine whether the ADEA is
appropriate legislation for enforcing the Equal Protection Clause in
154. Id. at 2207.
155. Id. at 2210.
156. lorida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2207. For example, the Court stated that the House
Report cited only two instances of patent infringement suits against the states. Id. The Court
also stated that there was no evidence of due process violations, since alternative remedies
for patent violations exist at the state level. Id. at 2208.
157. Id. at 2210. "The appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in
light of the evil presented. Strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an
unwarranted response to another, lesser one." City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530 (quoting South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)).
158. F7oridaPrepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2210.
159. Id.
160. Id. "Despite subjecting States to this expansive liability, Congress did nothing to
limit the coverage of the Act to cases involving arguable constitutional violations, such as
where a State refuses to offer any state-court remedy for patent owners whose patents it had
infringed." Id.
161. Id.
162. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000); Florida Prepaid v.
College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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combating age discrinination. 1 3 After examining the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence relating to age discrimination, it concluded
that the ADEA was not appropriate legislation for enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 64
The Kimel Court noted that the Supreme Court has upheld state
and federal laws against equal protection challenges in all three
state-defendant age discrimination cases that it has previously
decided. 16 In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, the
Court addressed an equal protection challenge to a Massachusetts
statute requiring its state police officers to retire upon reaching the
age of fifty. 66 The Murgia Court declined to apply strict scrutiny to
the statute because employment is not a fundament right, nor is
age a suspect classification. 67 Concluding that rational basis
scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review, the Court held that
the statute rationally relates to a legitimate state interest and is,
therefore, constitutional.' 68 The Murgia Court recognized that the
state has a legitimate interest in protecting the public and in
assuring that its police offices are physically capable of performing
their duties. 169 Given that physical performance generally declines
with age, the Court reasoned that the state could rationally use age
as a proxy for measuring the physical capability of its officers. 17 0
Although recognizing that age does not always accurately measure
physical performance, and that Officer Murgia himself was in
excellent condition, the Court concluded that the statute was still
rational.'7 1 Specific examples of physically capable, aged officers
only suggest that the state did not implement the best system for
evaluating its officers. 72 The Murgia Court held that although age
is an imperfect proxy for physical fitness, the Massachusetts statute
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 17 3
The other two state-defendant, age-based equal protection cases
163. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 644-45.
164. Id. at 647.
165. Id. at 645. The three cases are Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); and Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976) (per curiam).
166. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 308.
167. Id. at 312-13.
168. Id. at 314-15.
169. Id. at 314.
170. Id. at 315.
171. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 316.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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the Court decided closely followed Murgia.174 In Vance v. Bradley,
officers of the Foreign Service brought suit alleging that the
Service's mandatory requirement to retire at age 60 violated the
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 175 The Bradley Court reaffirmed the ruling in Murgia
that the proper standard of scrutiny for age discrimination is
rational basis scrutiny. 76 Since Congress could rationally conclude
that the rigors of the Foreign Service necessitated younger, more
77
vigorous officers, the Court upheld the mandatory retirement.
Similarly, in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court upheld a provision in
the Missouri State Constitution requiring its judges to retire at age
70.178 The Court recognized that age is an imperfect measure of an
individual judge's mental acuity; however, since the state need only
79
satisfy rational basis scrutiny, the Court upheld the provision.
In light of this equal protection jurisprudence, the Court in Kimel
found that the ADEA is "so out of proportion to a supposed
remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as
80
responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior."
The Kimel Court found that the Act's broad prohibition of age as
an employment classification prohibits more than would be
81
disallowed under the Constitution by the rational basis standard.
The Court also found congruence between remedy and evil lacking
because the legislative record of the ADEA revealed only that the
Act's purported abrogation of state immunity is "an unwarranted
response to perhaps an inconsequential problem." 8 2
The Kimel Court applied the congruence and proportionality test
of City of Boerne to ADEA legislation designed to enforce the
guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause.183 Just as in City of
Boerne and florida Prepaid, the Court found evidence of
174. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 452; Bradley, 440 U.S. at 93.
175. Bradley, 440 U.S. at 94-95.
176. Bradley, 440 U.S. at 97.
177. Id. at 110.
178. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 473.
179. Id.
It is far from true that all judges suffer significant deterioration in performance at age
70. It is probably not true that most do. It may not be true at all. But a state "does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its
laws are imperfect."
Id. (quoting Murgia, 427 U.S. at 316).
180. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 647 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 648-49.
183. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 645.
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unconstitutional conduct by the states tenuous at best and
that Congress enacted legislation that was
determined
indiscriminate in its scope.'l 4 Consequently, the Court held the
ADEAs purported abrogation of the states' sovereign immunity
invalid.""
With Kimel, the Supreme Court has applied the congruence and
proportionality test three times, and each time it invalidated an act
of Congress.18 6 Does Kimel signal a change in the current Court's
concept of federalism, or is Kimel merely another entry in a
growing catalog of Fourteenth Amendment do's and don'ts?
Regardless of which is true, this trilogy of cases will be carefully
examined as an exponentially growing body of Eleventh
187
Amendment litigation works its way through the courts.
How might Congress respond to the decision in Kimel? Given
that the Kimel Court divided on the issue of whether Congress
clearly intended to abrogate, just as the court of appeals below did,
future legislation will probably contain what Judge Edmondson
called "magic words."188 That is, future legislation will probably
have within it language such as, "eleventh amendment immunity,"
"federal court," and "suit by any person."189 Perhaps a less prosaic
184. Id. at 650.
Even if the California report had uncovered a pattern of unconstitutional age
discrimination in the State's agencies at the time, it nevertheless would have been
insufficient to support Congress's 1974 extensions of the ADEA to every State of the
Union. The report simply does not constitute evidence that unconstitutional age
discrimination had become a problem of national import.
Id. (citing Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2208).
185. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 650.
186. Hundertmark v. Florida Dept. of Transp., 205 F.3d 1272, 1277 (1lth Cir. 2000)
(holding that the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994), is appropriate legislation for
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment). In Hundertmark,the Court of Appeals ruled that the
Equal Pay Act, as amended, effectively abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Id. at 1274.
187. See William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh Amendment: Unfinished Business, 75
NoTRE DAME L REv. 843 (2000). In his article, Judge Fletcher points out that the Supreme
Court has decided more Eleventh Amendment cases in the last 25 years than in all the years
before. Id. at 844.
188. Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1433 n.15. "I do not say that certain magic words must be used
to abrogate immunity. I accept that Congress could unmistakably signal abrogation of
inununity in a variety of ways, and we write no general rules today." Id.
189. See Patent Remedy Act, 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994), which passed the unmistakable
clarity standard in FloridaPrepaid:
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity, shall not be immune, under
the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the united States or under any other
doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal Court by any person. 35 U.S.C. §
296(a) (1994).
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result of the Kimel trilogy might be for Congress to alter its Article
I spending legislation by conditioning receipt of federal funding
upon a waiver of sovereign immunity.19 ° While this avenue is within
the authority of Congress, it is, of course, subject to constitutional
limitations. Should the financial pressure of Congress become
outright compulsion, state sovereignty would again be at issue. 19'
As for Kimel's effect on future Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, it probably will not hearken in a new era. Perhaps
lurking within the penumbra of the Kimel Court's flavor of the
congruence and proportionality test is an attenuated subtlety to be
seized upon by a group seeking relief from discriminatory state
conduct. On the other hand, Kimel may prove to be a solid
affirmation of the shifting balance of federalism characterized by
Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne.192 At the very least, Kimel
reaffirms the proposition that "[c]ongress does not enforce a
constitutional right by changing what the right is." 193
The Kimel Court has, for the first time, balanced the equal
protection enforcement power of Congress with the sovereign
police powers of the states. If a state's age-based classification
rationally relates to a legitimate state interest, Congress must
overcome a high hurdle to preempt state law. Sufficient fact-finding
is necessary if Congress is to prevail, for it is through fact-finding
that Congress meets the crucial requirement of targeting
unconstitutional conduct. While Congress may restrict a broader
Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2203.
190. "The Congress shall have the Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the
United States." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. In South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), the
Supreme Court held that Congress may condition a state's receipt of highway funding upon
its adoption of 21 as the legal drinking age. Id. at 208. The Court has recognized that state
waiver of sovereign immunity is a permissible condition to attach to federal funding. See
Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267.
191. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S.
Ct. 2219, 2231 (1999) (discussing state waiver of sovereign immunity as a condition for
receiving federal funding).
192. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME
L REv. 859, 912 & n.193 (2000). "[Clonsider the Court's failure in Kimel to indicate that the
obligations imposed by the ADEA remain binding on the states and may be enforced through
suits for prospective relief and in actions brought by the federal government." Id. at n.193.
See also Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L REv. 653 (2000). "Thus Kimel
does not support the argument that the Court will offer more deference to Congress when it
seeks to enforce the Equal Protection Clause than when it seeks to enforce the Due Process
Clause, even if that equal protection interest only garners a low-level rational basis test." Id.
at 675-76.
193. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
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range of conduct than that expressly forbidden by the Fourteenth
Amendment, its prophylactic legislation must be congruent with a
permissible goal. If it is not, the legislative remedy will be so out of
proportion to the supposed harm that it will intrude upon the
lawful conduct of states that is protected by the state sovereignty
embodied in the Eleventh Amendment. Applying these principles to
the Equal Protection Clause, the Kimel Court firmly adhered to its
longestablished doctrine that it is the province of the judiciary, not
the Congress, to determine the substantive contours of the rights
embodied in the Constitution.
Gregory T Neugebauer, Ph.D.

